















CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMATICS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL 





The purpose of this study is to know and explain the problematics of the Constitutionality of 
Presidential Filling through general election in presidential system, as well as the 
constitutional problem of power relation of president and parliament to legislation authority 
in presidential government system in Indonesia. The type in this study is normative research 
using statutory approach, comparison approach, and case approach. The use of this type 
research is to examine and analyze the issues discussed in this study. The result of this study 
shows that: (1) The problem of filling the presidential office through general election in 
presidential system is the standardization of presidential threshold that is 20% (twenty 
percent) based on the Law of General Election (which has not been given number) is 
unconstitutional, because it is contradictory to Article 6A paragraph 2 and Article 22 E 
Paragraph 1 and 2. In addition, it is also contrary to the decision of the Constitutional Court 
Number 14/PUU-XI/2013 and to legalize the presidential threshold that has no philosophical 
basis in the presidential government system. Similarly, legalizing or presenting the 
presidential threshold into the law on elections with arguments for simplification of political 
parties does not have an empirical basis as in the empirical facts of elections in 1999, 2004, 
2009, and 2014. (2) The constitutional relation between the president and parliament in 
presidential practice in Indonesia has been a deviation caused by the norm of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia itself. The authors conclude that as long as the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is not amended, it implies sustainable state 
administration issues and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in the context of 
political reality and law does not adhere to the principle of constitutionalism as the essence of 
the constitution in every modern state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the system of constitutional democratic state, the position and role of president is 
very central in every country characterized by democracy. Moreover to the state 
characterized by presidential system, the position of president and the authority it possesses is 
a study that shows the indicator on the system of state administration as well as in the 
presidential government system adopted by a state.  
In addition, the level of presidentialism is also measured by the president's political 
power as head of state and head of government vis a vis with the legislative power relation in 
a country. The practice of presidentialism in the history of state administration dates from the 
history of the United States of America as an avant-garde of modern presidential practice. 
However, the model of power relations between the president and the legislative power in the 
practice of state administration varies across countries.1  
The emergence of a presidential system based on the constitution of a State to create a 
strong power and authority of the president and on the other side aims to stabilize the political 
system in relation with the legislative power based on the principle of check and balance. But 
on the other hand, the principle of state requires the relationship of constitutional state 
institutions must be equal and there is no subordination to each other. But in reality, based on 
legal and political reality in Indonesia, the presidential system is not as ideal as it is practiced 
in the first-time State. In the constitutional format, in fact the legislative body, in this case the 
Regional Representative Council (in Indonesian terms Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) 
subordinated in relation to the power and authority of the President and with the House of 
Representatives (DPR) in functions owned by the parliament. 
Based on the reality, the author is inspired to conduct in-depth study of 
presideansialisme system in legal and political reality in the state administration system in 
Indonesia, Problematic in the contrast of das sein and das sollen on the above background, 
the researcher formulates the problem as follows: (1) how is the problematic of 
constitutionalism of Presidential Filling through election in presidential system? and (2) How 
is the constitutional problem relating the power relations of the president and parliament to 
the legislative authority in the presidential government system in Indonesia? 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This type of research is normative legal research, ie research that is focused to 
examine the rules or norms in positive law. The approach used in this research is statutory, 
comparison, and case approach. 
The legal substances used in this study are primary legal materials consisting of the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the laws and regulations under it, as well 
as the constitution in various countries. While the secondary material is obtained from 
literature books, international journals, and other research reports. Then analyzed 
qualitatively and presented in deskrptif. 
                                                            
1In presidential systems an executive with considerable constitutional powers-generally including full control of 
the composition of the cabinet and administration-is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and is independent of 
parliamentary votes of confidence. He is not only the holder of executive power but also the symbolic head of state and can 
be removed between elections only by the drastic step of impeachment. In practice, as the history of the United States shows, 
presidential systems may be more or less dependent on the cooperation of the legislature; the balance between executive and 
legislative power in such systems can thus vary considerably. Vide, Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1990, p.52. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Constitutional Problematics of Filling Post President Through Elections in the 
Presidential System in Indonesia 
Election-related discourse as an indicator of a modern constitutional democracy State, 
almost all political scholars agree that elections are an important criterion for measuring the 
democratic level of a political system. For example, Robert A. Dahl, Gwendolen M. Carter, 
John H. Herz, Henry B. Mayo, Austin Ranney, and Sudhaussen are some of them.2  
In the context of the implementation of elections in Indonesia constitutionally to elect 
members of the People's Legislative Assembly, the Regional Representative Council, the 
President and the Vice President and the Regional People's Legislative Assembly, under 
Article 22 E Paragraph (2). Whereas in the Draft Bill on the Implementation of General 
Election, conceptualized as follows: 
The General Election is to elect the President and Vice President and to elect 
Members House of Representatives, Members of the Regional Representative 
Council, and Members of the Regional People's Legislative Assembly as a means of 
exercising the sovereignty of the people directly, publicly, freely, secretly, honestly 
and fairly in the State Unity of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Whereas the Election Contestants are the candidate pairs for the General Election of 
the President and Vice President, the political parties for the General Election of Members of 
DPR, Provincial DPRD Members, and Members of Regency/Municipal DPRD as well as 
individuals for General Election on DPD Members (Bill on the Implementation of General 
Election). 
From the regulation of elections, it should be interpreted that the presidential filling is 
held in elections held every five years. The logic implies the non-urgency of setting the 
presidential threshold as a condition to be an election participant. It is also in line with the 
verdict of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-XI/2013 that the simultaneous 
general election is a huge and inefficient budget wastage. Therefore, according to the 
Petitioners, the Presidential Election and the Election of Members of the Representative Body 
(which are not concurrent) are contradictory to Article 27 paragraph (1), Article 28D 
                                                            
2 Eef Saepulloh Fatah, 2000, Zaman Kesempatan : Agenda-agenda Besar Demokratisasi Pasca-Orde Baru, Mizan, 
Bandung, p.116. 
paragraph (1), Article 28D paragraph (3), Article 28H paragraph (1) Article 33 Paragraph (4) 
of the 1945 Constitution. 
Law governs regarding the procedure for filling the position through further clearance. 
Constitutionally based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia on the third 
amendment under Article 6A Paragraph (5) as follows “procedures for the implementation of 
the election of President and Vice President are further stipulated in law”. Implementation of 
presidential and vice presidential election procedures based on Law on General Election. 
Norms that are directly related to the procedure of filling presidential office through General 
Elections are arranged accordingly: 
Article 221  
Candidates for President and Vice President are proposed in 1 (one) pair by Political 
Parties or Combined Political Parties.  
 
Article 222  
The Candidate Pair is nominated by a Political Party or Combined Political Parties 
Participating in the General Election, which meets the requirements of a seats of at 
least 20% (twenty percent) of the total seats House of the Representative or obtains 
25% (twenty-five percent) of the nationally valid votes in the previous General 
Elections. 
 
Terms of filling the position based on the norm, it can be seen that a political party or 
a combination of political parties carries the submission or requirement to become a 
presidential candidate and vice president. Presidential candidates and representatives 
promoted by political parties or from a combination of political parties must meet the 
presidential threshold standard of 20% (twenty percent). 
From the procedure, according to the researcher, the standardization of the 
presidential threshold of 20% (twenty percent) is unconstitutional, as it is contradictory to 
Article 6A paragraph (2) stipulating that a political party or a coalition of political parties 
participating in the general election before the election proposes the candidate for President 
and Vice President. In addition, it is also contrary to the decision of the Constitutional Court 
Number 14/PUU-XI/2013. The implications of the Constitutional Court's decision, namely 
the a quo election participants, the presidential and vice-presidential candidates must be 
proposed before the election is held. That is, the presidential candidate and vice presidential 
candidate has been agreed by a combination of political parties before the election is held to 
elect the parliament and presidential and vice presidential candidate. In addition, the 
philosophical meaning behind the Constitutional Court's decision actually also aims to 
simplify the political party, because if the election simultaneously interpreted with 
presidensialism with multi-party system, a necessity of the presidential system experienced 
anomalies and political pragmatism and ending it gave rise to political decisions that harm 
each other.  
In comparison, filling the presidency in various countries. For example, a Chilean 
country that embraces a presidential system of government, the President is elected directly 
by the Chilean people through General Elections to elect the parliament and the president. 
This is as in Article 6 of the Chilean Constitution, which regulates as follows: 
The President of the Republic will be elected by direct vote and by absolute majority 
of the suffrage validly emitted. The election shall be held in conjunction with that of 
the parliamentarians, in the form determined by the respective constitutional organic 
law, the third Sunday of November of the year after which the [person] who is in the 
functions must cease the responsibility.  
The same is true with Azerbaijan, that the election is an election to elect the 
parliament and the President. This can be seen as Article 83 of the Constitution of The 
Azerbaijan Republic, which was amended in 2002 to elect the Azerbaijani parliament (Milli 
Majlis), namely: 
Principles of the Elections to the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic Deputies of 
the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic are elected on the basis of the majority 
and election systems and universal, equal, direct elections by free, individual and 
secret ballot. 
Meanwhile, to elect the President of Azerbaijan as follows: 
Article 101 
Foundations for the Election of the President of the Azerbaijan RepublicThe President 
of the Azerbaijan Republic is elected for a term of 5 years by universal, direct and 
equal elections by free, individual and secret ballot.  
From these comparisons, it indicates that in filling the positions of pridents and vice 
presidents through elections is simultaneously with parliamentary elections. Thus, the actual 
presidential threshold in the presidential election has no constitutional ground. The argument 
of researchers, that in the general election constitutionally done simultaneously. Based on the 
results of simulations conducted by LIPI, the use of parallel election system (simultaneously) 
at least able to produce the dominant political parties and make the simplification of political 
parties naturally.3 Concurrent election practice experience in Asia, the Philippines is an 
example of a country in Southeast Asia that introduces simultaneous executive and legislative 
                                                            
3 See Sri Yanuarti, 2014, Adaptasi Sistem Pemilu Paralel Bagi Indonesia, Pusat Penelitian Politik, Jakarta. 
electoral systems, except for the lowest executive positions in urban neighborhoods and rural 
villages.4  
Unlike the case with the presidential threshold, where the general election of president 
and vice president after the general election to elect members of parliament. The practice is 
precisely what is practiced in the parliamentary system in which the parliament is elected first 
in an election to elect the prime minister as head of government.  
In addition, the simplification of political parties as in the spirit of the Constitutional 
Court's ruling above, in reality that executes a presidential government system in a multi 
party system, has failed. This is as in previous research conducted by Scott Mainwaring5 
Reveals that the combination between presidentialism and the multi-party system of 
divisiveness appears to be in conflict with a stable democracy. Empirical evidence supports 
this argument, in the world there are relatively few presidential democracies that have 
survived for 25 years or more: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The presidential system in that country does not run in the corridor of the party's 
muliti system. 
According to Mainwaring Research, the presidential system can survive in a multi-
party political system, the only solution necessitating a coalition. It is as historical in tradition 
Traditional coalition practice in the presidential government system both in the European 
countries. Nor is it happening or practiced in Latin America. It is necessary when the 
government is in a minority situation in parliament. This reality becomes the rule of the game 
in a multiparty political system. In fact, if correlated with the bicameral parliamentary 
system, based on the results of research José Antonio Cheibub6 which states: 
“According to a worldwide comparative study of presidential democracies (1946-
1996), presidents did not have a majority in congress in more than half of the cases 
(53 percent); this rate being higher in bicameral (60 percent) than in unicameral 
systems (about 46 percent)”. 
                                                            
4 See Joel Rocamora, Philippine Political Parties, Electoral System and Political Reform, http://www.philsol.nl. 
Accesed on July 25, 2017. 
5 Scott Mainwaring, Presidensialisme di Amerika Latin, dalam Arend Lijphart, 1995, Sistem Pemerintahan 
Parlementer dan Presidensial, Translated by Ibrahim R. et.al., PT Grafindo Persada, Jakarta, p.119. 
6José Antonio Cheibub (2002), Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential 
Democracies, in Comparative Political Studies in British Journal of Political Science. P. 287. Vide too, Mariana Llanos, 
Explaining Coalition Performance in Presidential Systems: The Importance of (a Parliamentary-style) Coalition 
Management, Paper Presented at the Workshop “Parliamentary Practices in Presidential Systems: (European) Perspectives 
on Parliamentary Power in Latin America” European Consortium of Political Research Nicosia, Cyprus, 25-30 April 2006, 
p. 1. 
Moreover, according to José Antonio Cheibub, related to the phenomenon of coalition 
in presidential government system and multi party party bicameral parliament system as 
above, which in essence according to Cheibub that the practice of coalition is an implication 
of fragmentation of multiparty political system. Even such coalition practices are just like 
practices on parliamentary government systems, where the position of the government party 
becomes a minority in parliament. More results of Cheibub research as follows “As in 
parliamentary systems, the occurrence of minority governments in presidentialism is a 
consequence of the fragmentation of the party system” 
Even further according to Linz in Mainwaring that the presidential system is a rigid 
system than the parliamentary system of government. Linz's argument, that the stability of the 
parliamentary system of government that became an indicator in Linz's argument was that in 
the parliamentary system flexibility in changing the format of government aimed at regime 
stability. It is based on that argument that the coalition is formed on the parliamentary system 
of government, because the prime minister is a connector of the tongue and political ideas of 
parliament, More details as follows: 
As Linz (1984) notes, it is necessary to distinguish between cabinet stability and 
regime stability. Parliamentary systems have mechanisms that may lead to relatively 
frequent changes in cabinets and governments, but this flexibility in changing 
governments may help preserve regime stability. Conversely, the fixed electoral 
timetable of presidential regimes apparently ensures cabinet and governmental 
stability, but in practice has introduced a rigidity inimical to regime stability.7 
From these Linz statements, it shows that coalition practices are in fact more patterned 
parliamentary government systems. Thus, according to the researcher that the presidential 
government system, although not coalition of the political party, the executive power is not 
necessarily afraid of the political opposition of the opposition party in parliament, because the 
State institution in the modern state administration system is equal, based on the principle of 
constitutionalism and checks and balances. To corroborate the researcher's proposition, based 
on the history of presidential government system. The history of the emergence of such 
presidentialism, according to Moh. Kusnardi and Hermaily Ibrahim8 who stated that:  
                                                            
7 Scott Mainwaring, 1990, Presidentialism, Multiparty Systems, And Democracy: The Difficult Equation, Working 
Paper, Kellogg Institute. p.5 
8 Moh. Kusnardi and Hermaily Ibrahim, 1998, Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara, Sinar Bakti, Jakarta, p.177. 
“The background of the United States adopting the presidential system is the hatred of 
the people against the reign of King George III so that they do not want the form of a 
monarchic state and to realize their independence from British influence, so they 
prefer to follow Montesqieu's lead by holding a separation of powers, so there is no 
possibility of one Will exceed other powers, because in trias politika there is a system 
of checks and balances” 
In addition, the fact also indicates that the presidential threshold does not have a 
juridical, socio-political, and philosophical basis in filling the presidency in a presidential 
government system. In the case of a presidential threshold in the electoral bill for presidential 
filling, it is an unconstitutional act of law that is supposed to be petitioned for a Judicial 
review to the Constitutional Court and the interests of the positivization of the presidential 
threshold of political reality are only for the violation of power and the holding of other 
political parties and there is no relation to the simplification of the party Politics, as in 
previous efforts to raise a presidential threshold aimed at simplifying political parties. But, 
the result failed. For example, the 1999 elections imposed a two percent threshold. Of the 48 
parties, the threshold qualified for only six parties. In fact, 24 parties followed the 2004 
election. Further to the political reality of the 2009 elections, there were 38 national political 
parties competing throughout Indonesia and six other Acehnese political parties competing 
only in Aceh province. Nine political parties won seats in the House of Representatives 
(DPR) at the national level. After the 2009 election, the nine political parties changed the 
electoral law and established a much higher parliamentary threshold to register, compete and 
win elections. For example, political parties must have permanent offices in 33 provinces, at 
least in 75 percent of districts/cities in each province, and at least in 50 percent of sub-
districts in each district/city. In the legislative elections of April 9, 2014, 46 political parties 
registered but only 12 national political parties and three local political parties (who were 
allowed to contest in Aceh alone, competed with national parties) were successful and 
contested in elections.9 
Thus, any argument to legalize the presidential threshold is that it has no 
philosophical foundation in the presidential government system. Similarly, legalizing or 
prescribing the presidential treshold in the law on elections with arguments for simplification 
                                                            
9 Ibid., p.4. 
of political parties does not have an empirical basis as in the empirical facts of elections in 
1999, 2004, 2009 and in 2014. 
Constitutional Problematics Relation of Presidents Power and Parliaments on 
Authority of Legislation in the Presidential Government System in Indonesia 
Fundamental problems in the presidential government system are seen from the 
relation of the presidential and parliamentary authority in the context of policy formulation 
and the function of legislation. Anomaly relations between the president and parliament in the 
function of legislation are an uncommon in Presidential State practice. For example, the 
president and House of Representative as the full authority holder who commenced at the 
stage of proposing, discussing, until the approval stage of the draft law.  
The legal and political reality is an anomaly in the practice of state administration. 
This can be seen in the presence of a second-floor parliamentary institution whose authority 
is subordinated by the first chamber and the president's authority in the legislation function. 
The process precisely spans infiltration of the political interests of the ruling party and the 
infidelity of the House of Representatives with the President in the legislative function, 
because the process lacks control of the legislative process in the second-room parliament 
(DPD). On the other hand, when the ruling party in parliament (DPR), which is controlled by 
political opponents of the party winning the election of President and Vice President 
Candidate, is certain deadlock in the process of law formation caused by different political 
views and implies the failure of the government to serve the people's welfare through 
legislation (Especially the formation of laws related to politics and economics).  
This reality has relevance as stated by Barry K. Winetrobe, that in principle, in the 
process of formation of law in political configuration, not apart political influence (political 
interest) and coalition of electoral winning party against the process of forming the law.   
Barry K. Winetrobe10 state that : 
In a more political sense, the Parliament’s electoral system, being a form of 
proportional representation, makes single-party majority government unlikely. The 
operation of the Executive as either a formal coalition (as has been the practice), 
informal coalition or minority administration is bound to have an impact on 
                                                            
10 Barry K. Winetrobe, 2004, Making the Law In Devolved Scotland, Parliament, Politics, and Law-Making marks 
the tenth anniversary of the publication The Hansard Society, LSE, 9 Kingsway, London. P.55. 
lawmaking, both in the substance of legislation and in the operation of the 
parliamentary legislative process.  
Another issue of the constitutionality of the deadlock, the president's authority with 
regard to the function of legislation, the president's authority in the presidential government 
system in Indonesia does not have veto power in the event of differences and rejection of the 
draft law. The implications of the political reality and the constitutionality of the problem of 
the draft law should be brought to the next priority of the prolegnas. Article 20 Paragraph (3) 
which regulates the following: If the bill does not come into mutual consent, the draft law 
shall not be brought before the House of Representatives at that time.  
In addition, it should be in the presidential system government, the authority relation 
between the parliament and the president in a linear way as an effort to check and bless the 
State institution as the spirit of the constitution. It is the foundation for the existence of 
bicameral parliament as according to Philip Norton11 by stating that in essence as follows: 
“That the philosophical construction in choosing the option of a bicameral 
parliamentary model is inseparable from the possibility of giving reconsideration to 
the different spaces in the legislature in the functioning of the law, so as to avoid 
mistakes and improve the good quality and stability in making the law”. 
 
The Norton indication is reinforced by Mag Russel's opinion, which states as follows: 
“That in the bicameral parliamentary model is not only by reason of getting good 
quality and stability in the banning of the law. However, it can also improve 
efficiency as it is possible to divide the legislative workload between the two rooms. 
In this case, also referred to the function of legislation as one of the functions of 
parliament in the constitutional system”. 
In political and legal realities, this is not the case in Indonesia. It is not apart from the 
anomaly issue of the 1945 Constitution, which subordinates the authority of the second 
parliamentary, room (DPD) vis a vis with the first room parliament (DPR) and presdien. 
Particularly related to substantial authority in the second-room parliament in the 
constitutional system. Thus, according to the author, political parties are creating democracy, 
because the interests of sovereign owners (people) are hung by political parties by political 
                                                            
11 Philip Norton, 2004, ‘How Many Bicameral Legislatures Are There?’ The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
Vol.10, No.4 (2004), p.6-7. 
parties in the DPR. If examined on the legitimacy aspect of DPR and DPD, and the President 
is obtained from the same source.  
Thus, based on the constitutional problem as has been explained, according to the 
author is not inherent in the 1945 Constitution itself. For example, based on Article 22D 
Paragraph (1) to Paragraph (3), the authority of the DPD as a parliamentary institution is 
determined by the DPR, which is controlled by the interests of political parties. The political 
configuration of DPD as a regional representative is not balanced with the fulfillment of the 
interest of the region it represents. On the side of its legal configuration, the DPD can not 
design and veto the political interests of the DPR which is a political representative institution 
and the President as the executive representative in the legislation process. 
From the analysis, it shows that presidential practice in Indonesia has happened 
deviation caused by norm of 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia itself. The 
authors conclude that as long as the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is not 
amended, it implies sustainable state administration issues and the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia in the context of political reality and law does not adhere to the 
principle of constitutionalism as the essence of the constitution in every modern state. 
 
CONCLUSION 
1. The problem of filling the presidency by election in the presidential system is the 
standardization of the presidential threshold of 20% (twenty percent) based on the 
General Election Law (which has not been given a number) is unconstitutional, as 
opposed to Article 6A paragraph (2) and Article 22 E Paragraphs (1) and (2). In 
addition, it is also contrary to the decision of the Constitutional Court of Decision 
Number 44/PUU-XI/2013 and to legalize the presidential threshold that has no 
philosophical basis in the presidential government system. Similarly, legalizing or 
presenting the presidential treshold in the law on elections with arguments for 
simplification of political parties does not have an empirical basis as in the empirical 
facts of general elections in 1999, 2004, 2009 and in 2014. 
2. Presidential and parliamentary relation in presidential practice in Indonesia there has 
been a deviation caused by the norm of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia itself. The authors conclude that as long as the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia is not amended, it implies sustainable state administration 
issues and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in the context of 
political reality and law does not adhere to the principle of constitutionalism as the 
essence of the constitution in every modern state. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
To strengthen the presidential system in Indonesia, it is recommended as follows: 
1. Legal cancellation and no binding power of the norm provisions of the Presidential 
threshold in the filling of the post of president through general election; 
2. Strengthening the authority and function of the DPD in compensating for the political 
forces in relation to the DPR and the president; 
3. In the function of legislation, the president has veto power; 
4. Constitutional amendment. 
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